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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Pwintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

PAUL KAY BIGGS,

12971

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Paul Kay Biggs, appeals from the finding
of guilty of the crimes of burglary in the second degree
and grand larceny and the sentence imposed upon him
in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The defendant, on May 9th and 10th, 1972, was tried
by a jury for second degree burglary and grand larceny.
He was found guilty of both crimes and was sentenced
by the court to the Utah State Prison.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks to have the lower court's judg-
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that the defendant was prejudiced b
.
of the prosecuting attorney to make Ya t~e failur1 ,
of facts that he expected would app
tat€men:
States v. Sprague, 8 Utah 378 at 0";~· .PUnitE·! :
(1893).
'
. 11.4\ '

3i

The court's conclusion is a sound one which has
.
•
•
remamff
mtact smce the date of its rendition. Besides th
.
e tr· ,1
e~t vanety of each case which require flexibility, thi:
time lag between the commission of a crime and the re. :'
suiting litigation makes it difficult to plot in advance fu~ i
course that litigation may take.
inh'

·

'

The list of cases cited by the defendant beginnin :
1
with State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P. 2d 285 (19411. 1
are misapplied in this case. In Erwin the prosecutor en
gaged in a lengthy and vociferous dialogue in his opeoini
statement and the court was faced with the issue of w~ 1
an opening statement is inappropriate or procedurall1
impermissible because of its quality, and not if an open·
ing statement is required. As to the issue at hand
Sprague is controlling and should not be reversed.
There is another way of applying defendant's aixu·
ment that an opening statement should be required m
light of the modern spirit of discovery. When discover;
was not so advanced and the element of surprise remainlll
an element to be dealt with in each case, the needforan
opening statement to give some direction to the ~ ano '
allow defense counsel to marshal his evidence ro bis &
ent's best advantage was crucial. Today counsel llii
access to more facts prior to trial and should not be ~ur·
prised by the adversary's case. In light of tht'
a unprov~
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ment in our procedure the ruling as handed down in
Sprague is solidified and is made even more convincing.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT IS REQUIRED TO
GIVE ONLY INSTRUCTIONS SETTING
OUT THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME
ALLEGED AND THE REFUSE TO GIVE
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION WAS NOT ERROR.
Appellant's second argument is based on an exception to the court's refusal to give instruction No. 8 which
provides:

"It is the defendant's theory that the burglary

in this case was committed by Steve Turpin, Paul

Liapis, and others who are now testifying against
the defendant because of the immunity that they
have been offered by the District Attorney."

In order to determine whether or not the trial court
erred in refusing to give that instruction, it is necessary
to determine under what circumstances it is proper for
the court to refuse to give requested instructions. In 48
Cal. Jur. 2d Trial (1959), the following concepts are outlined:
"Though the court has no control over and
cannot interfere with the right of the jury to pass
on the facts and the credibility of the evidence,
except to the extent permitted by the constitution, it has supervisory power over their verdict.
To this end it is the court's duty and exclusive
function to instruct the jury in the law applicable
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to the facts of the case as develo d
dence, and relevant to the issues P~e bl.1the e1i.
pleadings and the evidence." 48 c~enJ~ by the
190.

· ur. 2d at

The court is duty bound to instruct the J'ury . h
.
mtel@
applicable to the facts of the case and when a
·
.
.
request~
~struction does not set forth any of the appropriate pfin. :
c1ples of law the court is not bound to give that · .
•
. .
. .
mstruc. ,
tion. Hlggins v. Willwms, 45 P. 1041 (1896). In 81-0ie ·
v. Dubois, 98 Utah 234, 98 P. 2d 354 (1940), thecourtrec.
ognized this requirement and added another:

"A party is entitled to have the jury in ·
stru~ted on the law governing the issues accordini 1
to his theory of the case, provided such theory 1'
tenable as a matter of law, or finds possible su~

port in the evidence. But he will not be hearu
to complain of failure to give instructions il toe 1
rules therein set forth are not a correct st.at.emeni
of the law; or if such statement of law is out.5ide
the issues to be determined by the jury;" 98 Utal1
234 at 245.
In order to be admitted, instruction No. 8 must meet one
or both of the requirements set out in Dubois. It is clea1
that the instruction in question is not a statement of la~
nor could it become such by any possible constructioa
The second requirement is therefore controlling as ro this
issue. The immediate problem confronting the jury in
this case was the guilt or innocence of the defendan~
and not the guilt or innocence of those testifying against
the defendant. Defendant's instruction calls for a juilg·
ment by the jury which they are unable to make ~use
evidence as to the guilt or innocence of Steve Turpmann

Paul Liapis was not introduced nor should it have been
when neither individual was being tried. The instruction
is beyond the issues which were before the jury and,
therefore, evidence sufficient to support the theory is not
found.
Respondent readily recognies the defendant's right
to an instruction posing a possible alibi and where the
the evidence is sufficient to support the instruction it
should be given. State v. Saunders, 82 Utah 170 at 176, 22
P. ?d 1043 (1933). However, requested Instruction No. 8
do~~s not deal with an alibi, nor does it set forth the law
applicable to the facts of this case. In Wellman v. Noble,
12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P. 2d 701 (1961), the court suggested
this standard:
"When the error assigned is the giving or failure to give instructions, the real inquiry should
be were the issues of fact necessary to be determined, and the principles of law applicable thereto, correctly presented to the jury in a clear and
understandable manner? That is the purpose of
instruction and if it is accomplished, the failure
to give additional ones is not of controlling importance." 12 Utah 2d at 352.
In order for the instruction to be admitted to it must be
a statement of law relevant to the facts or an issue of
fact which necessarily must be determined and which
finds support in the evidence. By these standards the
trial court should be affirmed in its refusal to include Instruction No. 8 in its instructions to the jury. It seems
fundamental that jury instructions are limited to elements of law as they apply to the facts of the case and
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as they apply to the particular crime[s] alleg d I
v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P. 2d 153 (19:6·) nthState .
' standard was announced:
' efoj· ·I
1owmg

"We have repeatedly criticized the givin
abstract statements of the law to the · g01
held that it is the duty of the court to ~~~· ~a
law .to the facts suppor~d by .the evidenc! anl
not
mstruct on any question
which is not m·voveu·
1J (
· h
.
m t e case under the evidence." 110 Utah at 131.
Respondent is convinced that the jury was instructedin
accordance with the law of this state and that it was not ·
error for the trial court to refuse defendant's requested I
Instruction No. 8.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY IN.
ST RU CT ED THE JURY AS TO THE
WEIGHT TO BE GIVEN TO THE TEST!.
MONY OF AN ACCOMPLICE AND THE
COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED IN·
STRUCTION.
I

The third assignment of error made by the defendant'
. I
is that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct theJUl'j
to carefully scrutinize the testimony of an accomplici
offered against the defendant. Respondent initially wouln
contend that the trial court's instructions taken as a
whole were sufficient to inform the jury of their responsibility and also were in harmony with the legal
standards required. Jury instruction number 6A (R. 2o)
pertaining to the standard to be applied to the testiroonv
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of an accomplice is nearly identical with the statutory
language of Section 77-31-18, Utah Code Annotated which
sets out the appropriate standard. The charge to the
jury given in Instruction No. 14 (R. 33) sets out the responsibility of the jury to weigh the testimony offered in
light of the background and relationship of the witness
who offers it and even when taken together with Instruction 6A (R. 26) it should not constitute reversible error.
Respondent is cognizant of the statutory requirement
that a conviction must be based on more than the testimony of an accomplice. Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18
(1953). Accordingly, we submit that the test set out in
State v. Cox, 74 Utah 149, 277 P. 972 (1929), as to the
sufficiency of corroborative evidence was met in this case.
" ... that the test of sufficiency of corroborative evidence is that it need not be sufficient in
itself to support a conviction, but it must implicate the accused in the offense, and not be consistent with his innocence, and must do more than
cast a grave suspicion on the accused." 74 Utah
at 152.
By turning to the record of the proceeding in the trial
court, several pieces of evidence serve to corroborate the
testimony of the accomplice who himself testified that
the defendant actually participated in the burglary. Testimony was offered to show the defendant had requested
infonnation as to any items of value that might be found
in the house that was burglarized (R. 86-87).
Testimony was given by a man who received the
stolen television from the defendant and sold it to an-
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other man who have a check for the television (R .
103). The same check had the defendant's end · lU\. '
.
orsement
?n it and was cashed by the defendant. This check wa;
mtroduced as state exhibit number 3-P ( R.99). Whe
the testimony and evidence which was brought forth b:
the state is taken together with all other evidence ~ '
vided the jury is not required to convict the defen:ani t
on the testimony of an accomplice alone. Rather as " !
r0quired by Cox, it does implicate the accused and is in i
no way consistent with his innocence and does more than
cast a grave suspicion on the accused. Respondent su~ ;
mits that the corroborative evidence offered against \ht i
defendant is sufficient to sustain the testimony of th1
accomplice, and taken together there was evidence to
support the jury's initial decision. We therefore urge the
1
court to reject defendant's assignment of error and allow r
the decision rendered by the trial court to stand.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that:
1. The law of this jurisdiction requires no openini ·
statement from the prosecutor and that the trial coun 1
did not err when it required no such statement from the

prosecution.
2. The requested instruction by defendant failed tu
state the appropriate law and was not supported by the
. tel reevidence of the case and was therefore appropna Y
fused by the trial court.

3. The instruction given by the trial court as rot~

11
need for corroborating evidence to support the t.estimony
of an accomplice was correctly given and no error was
committed by the court in refusing to give additional instructions concerning that subject.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attomeys for Respondent

